Copyright. April 6, 2013
By: Dr. Rahmat Rabi Zirakyar, Independent Scholar, USA
دا زموږ قسمت دی چې په ویـنو کې مزل وهـو یو قـدرت چې ووهـو بیا بل وهـو بیا بل وهـو
Destiny demands we wade through pools of blood.
We have defeated the powerful—
repeat we must defeat, and yet once more.
–A Pashto couplet
The above Pashto couplet points to the fate of the ancient Pashtun nation stretched between Oxus in the north and Indus in the south and reflecting historic trade and invasion routs. The battle between the former Silk-istan and current Pipeline-istan is now determining the Pashtun destiny. Pashtuns are the superpower of egalitarian conscience and a culture of resistance. In such capacity they have been fighting against militarily superior (super)powers reflecting humankind inherent desire to be free. Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1980-88) characterized the Afghan resistance against the fomer Soviet “Evil Empire” as “man’s highest inspiration for freedom.” Also, he praised the former Mujahedin as “the moral equal of our Founding Fahters .” But in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy the war in Afghanistan has been, to a great extent, put forth as a war for human rights of the Afghan people, namely to liberate them from the oppression of Taliban and the majority Pashtuns. Some nine years prior to the disaster of September 11, 2001, “CIA World Factbook” (a type of “finished intelligence”) had reduced statistics of the majority Pashtuns in Afghanistan. We shall go to the roots of this corrupt strategy. I am very thankful to Dr. Daud Miraki and Dr. Zaman Stanizai for their suggestions and constructive criticism of the rough draft of this writing.
The independent nature of the Pashtun people had unavoidable consequences for the Pashtun Nation. Their spirit of self-determination has collided with the colonial powers of the past and with the imperial powers of today.
With approximately 60 million in Afghanistan and on the other side of the British- imposed Durand Line (1893), current Pakistan, it is a potent force that has made the global powers with local and regional agendas nervous. Consequently, throughout history, the enemies of Pashtuns have conspired to undermine them by suppressing them directly or used local minorities to do their bidding. In the 20th century, when a charismatic King, Amanullah Khan (1919-29) led Afghanistan, British conspired and used a local bandit of minority Tajik background (Bacha Saqaw: the son of water carrier) to undermine independent Pashtun rule and the promise of progress on the horizon effectively elevating Afghanistan from underdevelopment.
Sixty years later in 1992, Afghanistan suffered from another Saqawi (by connotation, Saqawi is synonymous with chaos, anarchy): After the demise of the Soviet installed regime, Afghan minorities of the Northern Alliance embarked on a wicked campaign of fabrication and lies. The Massoud-Rabani regime destroyed the UN transitional plan and created an anarchy, a state of disorder and lawlessness that was called “The Second Saqawi” (Samsor Afghan). They inherited an anti-Pashtun initiative from the former Soviet Union that had a peace accord with Ahmad Shah Massoud (See Richardson). Massoud might have attempted to undermine Pashtun demographics during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. Hence, when the government of Burhanudin Rabani and his protégé Commander Ahamd Shah Massoud came to power in 1992, a more scrupulous and malicious campaign was launched to fundamentally change the demographic landscape of the Pashtun people in official records.
This malicious and hateful campaign consisted of using the government apparatus to undermine Pashtun majority status by fabricating statistics and sharing them with international organizations including the CIA World Factbook. This wicked yet strategic plan intended to cement the position of Afghan minorities in any future geopolitical dealing. Hence, in October of 2001, when the US invaded Afghanistan, the custodians of the post-1992 Tajik-led government, the Northern Alliance served the US’s interest and used those fabricated statistics that it secured during their reign (1992-1996) to make their case.
A Deliberate anti-Pashtun Campaign
Nineteenth century Muslim influential Scholar and anti-colonialist Sayed Jamaluddin Afghan (1837-1897), in his book “Tatmatul Bayan Fi Tarikhul Afghan”, paid attention to Pashtuns as the prevailing element of Afghan social structure (Prof. Sediqullah Reshtin, New Reseach (Peshawar/Pashtunkhwa, 1979, p. 98):
پوهاند صدیق الله رښتین، نوې څیـړنې(پیښور، پښتونخوا، ۱۹۷۹، مخ ۹۸ )/ د افغانستان قــومي جوړښت د افغانستان لپاره د واک فونډیشن شپـږ کلنه(۱۹۹۶-۱۹۹۱) سروې او څیـړنه،لمریز ۱۳۷۷= ۱۱مخ، ۱۹۹۸
The deliberate undertaking by the Massoud-Rabani regime (April 1992-September 1996) to downgrade majority Pashtun demographics was immediately reflected in CIA World Factbook (July 1992). What was the purpose of this tactic? This pursuit is deeply rooted in the nature of Soviet/Russian design, which backed minority ethnic politics to override national politics in Afghanistan. A U.S.-educated and prolific socio-political analyst of Afghan descent Dr. Stanizai has succinctly explained the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan.
I will organize his approach in six steps.
STEP ONE: The Soviets/Russians focused on the debasing of “the most resistant” of the ethnic groups; namely, the majority Pashtuns because they were usually the leading group in the Afghan armed forces, a majority among the Afghan resistance organizations, and “the cultural core of Afghanistan’s ‘national’ identity”. To clarify his statement, Dr. Stanizai writes that the “uncompromising” resistance commander Zabihullah Mujahed was “the only” non-Pashtun, whom the Soviets “wanted dead” and whose unyielding position “may have done him in”.
STEP TWO: The Soviets/Russians worked on curtailing the numerical strength of the Pashtun population: They stepped up their military operations and aerial bombardments of the Pashtun areas in the south, while leaving the non-Pashtun areas in “relative calm” and “virtually intact”. Indeed, at one point, the Soviets contemplated the idea of “moving the capital” from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif in the north, the second largest Afghan city, “replacing Kandahar, which laid in ruins”.
STEP THREE: In 1989 the Soviet forces retreated beyond the northern borders of Afghanistan, due to two realities on the ground: They pulled back only “after making sure” that (a) the resistant Pashtuns had been “weakened sufficiently”, and they would not be pursued into Central Asia (as the then U.S. President George H. Bush pursued “a rapprochement with a kinder and gentler declining” Soviet Russia).
STEP FOUR: The non-Pashtun minorities in the north were organized in the Northern Alliance (originally named: Supervisory Council of the Northern Regions= shora-e nezar-e safahat-e shamal). This was a unified minority front to fight against “all aspects of the Pashtun life”. Dr. Stanizai writes that “thus on the eve of the centennial” of the colonial Durand Treaty that had divided Afghanistan in 1893, “a deep chasm was created in the ethno-linguistic mosaic” of Afghanistan.
STEP FIVE: Supported by the Soviets during the resistance and their staunch former Afghan Communist leader Babrak Karmal’s generals, the Northern Alliance leader Massoud claimed victory in Kabul in Apil of 1992 and replaced Karmal’s successor Dr. Najibullah, an ethnic Pashtun. Massoud attributed his triumph to the Northern Alliance, to which Karmal ethnically belonged. This gesture was symbolic in the ethnic political arena organized around “Tajik supremacy” while undermining, targeting and depriving the Pashtun majority. The Northern Alliance under the leadership of Massoud was implementing “the ‘anybody-but-Pashtun’ agenda”. Massoud forced President Sebghatullah Mujadidi, a figurehead, out of office after two months and replaced him with Borhanoddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik.
With the onset of the Tajik-centered government installed and run by the Massoud-Rabbani team, a deliberate anti-Pashtun campaign began with the explicit goal of defrauding Pashtuns of their identity, using the State apparatus and institutions. Using bureaucratic fraud and coercion, large segment of Pashtuns inside Afghanistan and returning refugees from Pashtunkhwa (former NWFP: 1901-2010) were given new national identity cards that identified them as Tajiks. This was part of a calculated campaign to undermine the majority status of Pashtuns and fraudulently increased the percentage of Tajiks. Other ethnic minorities targeted Pashtuns violently by terrorizing them. For example, Hazara forces targeted Pashtun homes and violated Pashtun families until they were forcefully evicted from their homes, particularly in the 3rd and 4th districts of Kabul. Similarly, Uzbek militia looted homes in the predominantly Pashtun districts of the city until Pashtuns abandoned their homes and became refugees inside and outside the country. At the “national” level, “the ethnic cleansing campaigns began in the north”, where entire Pashtun villages were depopulated through campaigns of terror. Also, for further information on Massoud’s links to Soviets/Russians ,see U.S. thorough and trustworthy expert on Afghanistan, author, and journalist Richardson, who traveled to Afghanistan in 1986, 1987, 1990,1991and 1997.
Consequently, the Tajik led government of Massoud-Rabbani concocted new census aimed at distorting the ground realities of Afghan society by reducing Pashtuns from nearly 60% to 38% and increaseing the proportion of Tajiks from 12% to 25%. The Kabul regime disseminated these figures to international organizations as official data ( Stanizai received this information from the late Afghan academician Abdul Shakur Rashad (1921-2004), whose private home-based library was looted by Northern Alliance warlords). Soon these fabricated population figures were reflected in the CIA World Factbook (July 1992) and most probably from this source to the National Geographic World Atlas and the World Almanac, among other publications. The CIA even sent CDs of the above data to Russian libraries (an Afghan living in Russia reported about this information in printed Afghan media in Western Europe. Zirakyar). For more information about the above six steps, consult Stanizai, “From Identity Crisis to Identity in Crisis in Afghanistan”. Electronic version: December 16, 2009. http://www.stanizai.org/ [November 15, 2012]. Stanizai is a sharp political analyst in Afghan and Islamic affairs.
Today( April 25, 2013), I received an important write up by Richardson, who is not in reality a “Pashtun Ghost Writer”, but a resourceful and honest American journalist, author and expert on the issues of Afghanistan. The anti-Pashtun plot discussed in Talooqan conference of 2003 might have been running parallel to the CIA’s statistics that reduced majority Pashtuns to the largest minority in Afghanistan (Talooqan is the capital of the Takhar province in northern Afghanistan).This plan reminds us of the former Soviet leader Brezhnev’s scheme to divide Afghanistan in 1981. The Talooqan plan was forged by American private imperialism and Russia, the successor of former social imperialism. The late Burhanuddin Rabani, the former Tajik president of the civil war period (1992-96), participated in the Talooqan conference. “The anti-Pashtun orientation of the Bush Administration financed and fueled the conference, which was reported to have cost $75 million dollars.” At the Talooqan conference of 2003 “were present all factions of the Northern Alliance accompanied by an ever-present throng of Communist generals,” but the majority Pashtuns “were denied representation” in the above conference. (Richardson, April 25, 2013).
Afghan Ethnic and Linguistic Statistics Collected from the CIA World Factbook (1981-2012 = 1360-1391 Solar Hijri)
According to CIA, its own “CIA World Factbook” is one of the three types of “finished
intelligence”, which means “the final product of intelligence cycle”, which in turn is the process by which information is (a) received, (b) refined( “analyzed and interpreted”) into intelligence and (c) presented to policymakers. The other two types of finished intelligence are “The President’s Daily Brief” and the “National Intelligence Estimates”. Former intelligence officer Robert L. Suettinger relates that National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) “necessarily have to devolve into a realm of speculation”. The October 2002 prewar intelligence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction soon became nothing more than the “mashroom cloud” of lies. After this war, however, U.S. and British leaders justified their action by focusing on the character of Saddam Hussein rather than on the evidence for his capabilities. British leader Churchill mentioned to Soviet leader Stalin at the Teheran Conference in 1943: “In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”
Social and Political Science Professor and President of American Political Science Association (2001) Robert Jervis wrote: “All too often…intelligence estimates tell us more about interests and foreign policy preferences of powerful groups in government than it does about what the other side’s intentions and capabilities are.”
In context of “the clash of civilizations”, the CIA’s statistics for Afghan ethnic and linguistic groups can be interpreted.
The following table presents the estimated statistics of Afghan ethnic and linguistic groups from 1981 to 2012. From 1992, the percentage of Pashtuns and their language was significantly lowered in the CIA World Factbook. The year 1992, when the CIA lowered the Pashtuns’ statistics, their attempt coincided with the onset of pro-Tajik regime of Massuod and Rabani in Afghanistan, which destroyed the UN transitional plan.
Afghan Demographics in CIA World Factbook 1981-2012
Year Ethnic Group Percentage Language Percentage Total Population
Estimates Estimates Estimates
کال قومي سلنې ژبـنئ سلنې ټول وګړي
1981(1360) Pashtuns 50% Pashto 50% 15,193,000
Tajiks 25% Farsi(Persian) 35%
Hazaras 9% Uzbeki,Turkmeni 11%
Uzbeks 9% all other languages 4%
All others 7%
1990(1369) Pashtuns 50% Pashto 50% 15,862,293
Tajiks 25% Farsi 35%
Hazaras 12%-15% Uzbeki,Turkmeni 11%
Uzbeks 9% all other languages 4%
All others 3%-4%
1991(1370) Same as above Same as above 16,450,304
1992(1371) Pashtuns 38% Pashto 35% 16,095,664
Tajiks 25% Farsi 50%
Hazaras 19% Uzbaki,Turkmeni 11%
Uzbeks 6% all other languages 4%
All others 12%
2001(1381) Pashtuns 38% Pashto 35% 26,813,057
Tajiks 25% Farsi 50%
Hazaras 19% Uzbaki,Turkmeni 11%
Uzbaks 6% all other languages 4%
All others 8%
2006-2012 Pashtuns 42% Pashto 35% (31,056,997;
(1385-1391) Tajiks 27% Farsi(Persian) 50% 31,889,923;
Hazaras 9% Uzbeki & Turkmeni 11% 32,738,376;
Uzbeks 9% all other languages 4% 33,609,937;
All others 13% …………………………. 29,835,392;
July 2012 estimates…. 30,419,928).
Data collected and organized from the “CIA World Factbook” by Rahmat Zirakyar
Now, the question is justifiable whether the reduction of Pashtun statistics in the “CIA World Factbook”(1992-2012 ) is self-serving, a mask for U.S support for minority rule in Afghanistan following the 911 catastrophe?
Shedding Light on CIA World Factbook Statistics for Afghanistan
It is important to mention that ethnic divisiveness was first used by Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the 18th and 19th century as a vehicle for dividing and conquering. During their occupation of Afghanistan (December 1979-Febraury 1989), the Soviets tried to lower statistical significance of the majority Pashtuns in their country. The purpose of this politics was to prepare Afghanistan for partition. To achieve this goal, the Soviet military operations tremendously debased and dehumanized Pashtuns while recruiting non-Pashtun Massoud, Dostam and others to facilitate the transition of northern tier of Afghanistan into the Soviet system. There were two probable ways for the realization of this design: Via partition of Afghanistan or its eventual annexation to Central Asian Soviet republics, where Afghan Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen have ethnic kinsmen.
The name of Afghan communist Babrak Karmal (1929-1996) is synonymous with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989). In his era (1979-1986), a campaign for population census was launched to manipulate Pashtun population statistics. To effortlessly manipulate the demographic realities, most of the time this question was asked: “In which language are you fluent?” ( ba kodam lesan mosalat asted?).
به کدام لسا ن مسلط استید
(Private information shared with me by a member of the Central Committee of the then ruling People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Zirakyar).
Since many Pashtuns are able to speak Pashto as well as Dari, their answers reflecting confidence in both languages were manipulated to mask the true size of the Pashtun people and falsely elevate Tajik percentage in the country. This way, the pro-Soviet Karmal’s census crew camouflaged the ethnic identity o Pashtuns. Generals of the Karmal faction sided with Ahmad Shah Massoud and helped him to consolidate power in Kabul in April of 1992 whereby effectively neutralizing the U.N. transition plan. Consequently, this maneuvering coalition along ethnic and linguistic lines led to the “Second Saqawi”: anarchy and the civil war (1992-1996).
It is important to know that the academic landscape of international relations and global politics faced certain fundamental morphological transformation. After all, the Soviet Union was on its deathbed and a new reformulation had to emerge to both make sense of the emerging changes and serve as forecasts for future policy formulations. Hence, soon after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February of 1989, “The Roots of Muslim Rage” (1990) by Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern History Bernard Lewis and “The Clash of Civilizations?” (1993- expanded to a book in 1996) by renowned Political Scientist Professor Huntington) emerged. Generally, the West discovered Islam (officially radical Islam) as the “New Communism”. In context of such political mentality, CIA World Factbook statistics for Afghan ethnic and linguistic groups can be interpreted.
The CIA World Factbook is published each year in the month of July. As we know, the anti-Pashtun Northern Alliance came to power in Kabul in the month of April 1992. In less than three months after this event, the CIA World Factbook was published in the month of July, in which the statistics of majority ethnic Pashtuns were considerably reduced from 50 percent to 38 percent and those of their language from 50 percentage to 35 percent. I want to explain this issue: For the first time in 1992, The CIA World Factbook considerably lowered the statistical significance of Pashtuns. (Zirakyar, 2009; and Richardson, 2009, p.275).
What is the purpose of inflating the population size of non-Pashtun minorities while downgrading the majority Pashtun demographics? The lasting and enduring relations between CIA and Northern Alliance suggest that both of them needed each other’s cooperation in reducing Pashtun ethnic and linguistic statistics. This deliberate and self-serving undertaking by the CIA to lower Pashtun socio-linguistic data is indicative of a public relations ploy for a world-wide support for an unjust war, which was packaged as a just war: to free the majority (minority non-Pashtuns) from the so-called oppression of the minority (majority Pashtuns). This statistical-psychological operation helped Washington to disenfranchise and alienate the majority Pashtuns. Hence, the CIA World Factbook reduced the size of Pashtun population in Afghanistan from majority Pashtuns to the largest ethnic group in their country.
Two reliable Afghan scholars whose names need not be disclosed told me (Zirakyar) that three men were “involved” (dakheel) in the process of reducing Pashtun statistics: Two (R.F. and E.E) are non-Pashtun Afghans holding PhD’s in linguistics, and the third one (T.F.) is a U.S. expert on Afghanistan with good ties to “Zal” (Zalmay Kh.). From the two non-Pashtun Afghan linguists one is a translator and teacher in a U.S. military establishment, and the other was a high-ranking politician in previous Afghan governments. Both of them had maintained very good relations with Massoud-Rabbani regime in Kabul (April 1992-September 1996). Once again, this information substantiates my assertion that the CIA and the Massoud-Rabbani regime needed each other’s cooperation to decrease the majority Pashtun demographics. Massoud and his acolytes hated Pashtuns, particularly their language Pashto because it has the substance for the national identity of Afghanistan as a state and as a country. A Pashto proverb says: “Don’t kill the beggar, just take away his begging bowl.”
ملنګ مه وژنه، کچکـول ورنه واخـله
Colonialism not only controls colonized people through administrators of the dominant colonial culture but indirectly by using subservient members of the colonized culture. Colonialism and imperialism are considerably similar and each energizes the other: Their motive is to exploit the colonized or controlled nations. Massoud served as dues ex machina in the Soviet, Iranian and American political agenda in Afghanistan.
A U.S.-born Eric Margolis is a veteran journalist, writer and “Eisenhower Republican,” who writes mainly about the Middle East, South Asia and Islam. He came to the conclusion in 2009 that America cannot establish peace and stability in Afghanistan unless the majority Pashtuns (“55%”) are “enfranchised”, namely “dealing directly with Taliban”, who are “part of the Pashtun people”.
The following tabulation presents the ethnic and linguistic statistics presented by the late Afghan Academician Abdul Shakur Rashad as a reaction to the false demographics published in the CIA “Word Factbook” only three months after the onset of pro-Tajik regime, in July 1992.
Date and Place of Publication
Percentage of Major Ethnic Groups
Prof. M. Ali
|The National Languages of
|The World of Geoethnology||
M. Mahjub Yawari
1987 (5th Ed.) Iran
|World’s Largest Languages||
|History and Establishment of
Abdul Azim Walyan
Afghanistan and the Taliban
|Afghanistan Federal System||
M. Enam Wak
|The World Almanac||
In the second row of the above table, the last name of German-speaking Austrian expert on Afghanistan is misspelled (Clumborg). Its correct spelling is Klimburg. Max Klimburg holds graduate degrees in Art History and Ethnology. His book was published in 1966 with this complete title “Afghanistan: Das Land im historischen Spannungsfeld Mittelasiens”. I am very sure that this is the book quoted in the above table. Now, I will turn to other western sources dealing with Afghan demographics.
Estimates of Afghan Ethnic Statistics Presented in Other Western Sources
Gul Janan Sarif indicated in his dissertation thesis (1972) that from 11-12 million Afghans circa nine million have Pashto as mother language. H.F. Schurmann estimated ( 1962) that Pashtuns make up at least half of the Afghan population. Similarly, D.N. Wilber (1962) figured that Pashtuns make up 50%-60% of the Afghan population. According to Area Handbook for Afghanistan (4th edition, 1973), from 16 million Afghans “over 8” millions are Pashtuns. According to. Magnus and Naby (1998), the Pashtuns “form the most important and probably the most numerous ethnic group in Afghanistan….the standard estimate is that 40 to 50 percent of the [Afghan] population is” Pashtuns (p.12). Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. III (1992) estimates that Pashtuns “constituted from 50 to 60 percent of the population of prewar Afghanistan . Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996 ) wrote that Pashtuns “comprise the largest group, 54% of the total population.” The official languages of Afghanistan are Pashto and Dari “or Persian” that are “spoken by 52% and 30% of the population respectively.” Fareed Zakaria, the host of CNN’s important foreign affairs show (GPS), was discussing with Peter Galbraith (former U.N. Representative to Afghanistan). Here Zakaria spoke of “majority Pashtuns, 50%”. April 11, 2010). Arnold was a U.S. intelligence officer assigned to Afghanistan, Germany, Sweden, Burma, Japan, and England. He retired in 1979. In his book (1983, P. 2), Arnold wrote that Pashto is “the native tongue of about 55 percent of the population. Nevertheless, Arnold is pointing out to a prevailing and strange linguistic reality in Afghanistan: “Oddly, although Pashtuns comprise over half the population, their language is not the dominant one.”
Nyrop and Seekins (2001/ Electronic Version) stated that most population statistics in Afghanistan are founded on estimates. The first and “most scientific demographic survey” was implemented in Afghanistan in 1972-1974 by the State University of New York for the United States Agency for International Development (AID), in cooperation with the then Afghan government. This survey declared a settled population of 10.8 million. However, it did not report the nomadic population, which was “separately estimated at slightly more than 1 million” (p.99). On the same page we can read that the Afghan population estimate in 1995 amounted to 18.4 million. A few pages later we can easily decipher another population estimate in 1996: “approximately” 40% of Afghans were Pashtuns, successively followed by 25.3% Tjiks,18% Hazaras, 6.3% Uzbeks, 2.5% Turkmen, while other ethnic groups totaled to 7.9% including 1% Qizilbash (p. 104). Now, take a look at another population size of Pashtuns in 1995 on the same page: “The largest and traditionally most politically powerful ethnic group” of Pashtuns reached in 1995 “an estimated 10.1 million…”(p.104). If we divide this estimated number by the estimated total population number, the result for Pashtun population size shall be nearly 55%, unless it is an error committed by the authors/editors (Nyrop and Seekins)? 10,100,000/18,400,000=0.5489=55% Pashtuns.
Even U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks (June 2000-July 2003) who led the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, spoke of “majority Pashtuns” (see below).
Let’s take a look at a few French sources. According to Encylopedia de L’Agora (2013): Pashtuns make up 38% and their language Pashto35% , Tajiks are (25%), and “perse afghan” (Dari ) 50%, Hazaras are19%, Turkmens are 11%. As reported by Le petit Larousse (2011): Pashtuns are 40% and Tajiks are 30%. As stated in Larousse Encyclopedique (2007): Pashtuns amount to 40%. Pursuant to ONG show (Tomorrow’s Afghanistan) created in 2001: Pashtuns constitute 40%), Tajiks 32%, Hazaras 9%. In keeping with Atlas Economique Mondial (2000), Pashtuns consist of 38%, Tajiks 25%, and Hazaras 14% of the Afghan population. I am very thankful to Dr. Osman Rostar Taraki for sharing the above French data with me (March 13, 2013).
The French statistics for Afghan ethnic composition need to be scrutinized. They illustrate the French government’s strong inclination toward an anti-Pashtun group and its so-called “legendary” commander Massoud. We can easily identify resemblance between the above French and CIA’s statistics about the Afghan ethnic and linguistic structure. The reason is that former colonial France and current imperial U.S.A. have a common denominator for the realization of their national interests: the political puppet Ahmad Shah Massoud. He had the courage to auction the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan to colonial and imperial powers (Soviet Union, Russia, France, and U.S.A.) and Persian-speaking Iran without any discrimination.
I assume that after 1992 British and German sources might have followed the CIA’s template for the Afghan socio-linguistic composition.
To refute the cooked up statistics, I need to present the Wak Foundation for Afghanistan’s comprehensive study and data. Until now, this research and survey project has produced the most authoritative and authentic document on the ethnic composition of Afghanistan.
Wak Foundation’s Statistics for Afghan Ethnic and Linguistic Groups
For the record,“The Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan” is a six-year survey and research project ( April 1991- July 1996). It was conducted by the then Peshawar/Pashtunkhwa-based Wak–Foundation for Afghanistan which was published in 1998 (1377 Solar Hijri). This self-funding organization is Research and Implementation Institute for Afghanistan’s Rehabilitation, Development and Drug Control Programmes. Engineer Mohammad Enam Wak is the Founder and President of the Wak Foundation for Afghanistan (I will be using here its short form: Wak Foundation). He is of Tarin-Pashtun heritage born in 1954 in Sorkhrod of Nangarhar province and graduated from the Geology Department at the Kabul University in Afghanistan. Enam Wak is the author of several publications in his mother language Pashto. While working in Iran, his two books were published there in Farsi (Persian). To refute the cooked up statistics, I need to present the Wak Foundation for comprehensive study and data for Afghanistan.
Until now, this research and survey project has produced the most authoritative and authentic document on the ethnic composition of Afghanistan. In 2012 The Aryana Encyclopedia (da aryana daieratul ma’aref) in Kabul printed (p. 455) ethnic statistics that are matching with those published by the Wak Foundation in (1998= 1377 Solar A.H.): Pashtun (62.73%), Tajik(12.38%), Hazaras (9%), Uzbeks (6.10%), Turkmen (2.69%), etc. Mrs. Soraya Popal, who is currently the President of the Academy of Sciences in Kabul, had declared the above statistics in the House of Representative of Afghanistan (wolasi jarga). Below is the Pashto text published in the Aryana Encyclopedia:
«دافغانستان ملی اتنیکی جوړښت چې په دې وروستیو کې څرګند شوی او په لاندې ډول وړاندی کیـږي: پښتانه ۶۲،۷۳، تاجک ۱۲،۳۸، هزاره ۹،۰۰، ازبک ۶،۱۰، ترکمن ۲،۶۹، ایماق ۲،۶۸….»- مخ ۴۵۵، اریانا دایـرة المعارف
Wak Foundation’s Methodology Credibility
The survey of Wak Foundation has credibility for the detailed and meticulous efforts; familiarity with the cultural nuances and socio-ethnic organization of the Afghan society; and the time spent achieving results.
Consultations with Afghan scholars, intellectuals, dignitaries, former civil servants, teachers, and religious and tribal leaders took place. These discussions broadened the survey staff members’ horizon to respect the socio-cultural norms of local communities, as the circumstances may require. Also, they were trained by experts. Besides, preliminary survey was conducted in early 1991 among refugee population residing in Iran( Tehran and Mashad), Peshawar, and Quetta. Similar exploratory interviews were run with knowledgeable people in large cities of Afghanistan in early 1991. This survey started with zone and extended down to the village. The actual survey in Afghanistan was mainly conducted on the district (wolaswali) level while in some locations on the village level (May 1991-September1996). During the actual survey, some of its field members went to Russia and Central Asian countries in 1995 . Their mission was to verify with Afghans there the data of the preliminary survey conducted in Afghanistan’s northern provinces. “Some of the interviews” conducted in central Asian countries “obliged” the Wak Foundation to “repeat the survey in some” of the northern provinces of Afghanistan like Baghlan, Samagan and Balkh. “A few districts in these provinces” were reexamined in early 1996. Nancy Hatch Dupree, the wife of the late U.S. distinguished expert on Afghanistan Professor Louis Dupree, wrote in her endorsement of the Wak Foundation project about the Afghan ethnic composition: “ Rarely have Afghans taken an interest in this bewildering subject”. Therefore, she complimented Wak for “ being a pioneer in this essential endeavour” (11 June 1998, University Town, Peshawar). A short version of this 255-page book in Pashto was published in English in July of 1999 in Peshawar, and its final draft was “edited” by Nancy H. Dupree.
Attempt to Kill Mohammad Enam Wak, June 1, 2000
The effectiveness of the Wak Foundation became a threat to the conspirators of both the Massoud-Rabani regime in Kabul and the Punjabi-run government of Pakistan. To destroy this important institution at its core, they might have hand in the attempt to assassinate the founder and president of the Wak Foundation.
Following the Pashto version of The Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan (1998), its compact English version was published in July of 1999. A third book published by Wak was Federalism in Afghanistan (2000), in which he discussed the unification of Pashtuns on both sides of the illegal, invalid and immoral Durand Line of 1893. Peshawar-based Afghan sources believed that these three book had unsettled the Pakistani intelligence and Massoud. The leader of the Northern Alliance Massoud could not tolerate (a) the Pashtun identity of Afghanistan, (b) the Pashtun ethnic statistics in Afghanistan (62.73%) and (c) the need for Pashtun unification. The Pakistani intelligence service was agitated by the argument of Pashtun unification. In light of such positions, one can argue that the decision to assassinate Enam Wak was triggered by the above three books. Leaving his home for work, Eanm Wak was repeatedly shot in the front of the exit door of his residence in Peshawar by unidentified gunmen on June 1, 2000: twice in the left arm and once in the abdomen (Wak saw two men at the two front corners of his residence). After
being released from the hospital, he took refuge in Norway.
The probability of Massoud involvement in the attempted assassination of Wak is more likely than the Pakistani Intelligence service since Massoud had to gain a lot more from his death than the Pakistani Intelligence. Moreover, Pakistani Intelligence has professional assassins and they make sure the targeted person does not survive. The fact that Wak survived points to the culprits wanting to dissipate expeditiously in order to avoid capture by local police. Had it been the Pakistani Intelligence, they would have made sure to finish him before departing the scene of the crime since they had no reason to worry about capture.
Wak Foundation Criticizing Previous Population Statistics
Due to the fact that the Afghan society is heterogeneous, Wak Foundation has
criticized the collection of previous population statistics for these reasons:
First, the previous population statistics did not distinguish between ethnic and language groups in Afghanistan: For example, Persian (Farsi, Dari)-speaking ethnic Pashtuns in Herat were counted as Tajiks. Farsi-speaking Hazaras are ethnically Hazaras, not Tajiks. Although members of the Afghan royal family were using the Afghan version of Persian (Dari), they were not called Tajiks, but Mohammadzai Pashtuns. The Pashtun society is predominantly tribal, in which the identity is secured mainly by ethnicity (qaum). If we compare the Afghan society to an orange, then language is the skin of the orange, not the independent parts (tribes) within its skin.
Determining the ethnic percentage in Afghanistan by mixing language identity with ethnic identity caused problems for determining ethnic identity. This means that Tajik is not an ethnic identity, but a default linguistic identity. Consequently, Pashtuns, who could or did not speak Pashto, were counted as Tajiks. Farsi/Dari speaking Pashtuns lost their cultural/language identity by 7.73% to Tajiks: Pashtuns are ethnically 62.73% of the total Afghan population. However, linguistically/culturally they are 55%. Nevertheless, Pashtuns made up ethnically as well as culturally the majority of the total Afghan population (17,918,454) in 1996, the year of the completion of the Wak Foundation’s survey.
Second, smaller ethno-religious minorities like Ismailite Tajiks and Shiite Qizelbash are counted with Hazaras. This, in turn, increased the number of Hazara group. U.S. anthropologist and expert on Afghanistan Louis Durpree (1929-1989) deemed Taimanis as part of Aimaqs; however, they are originally Pashtuns, not Aimaqs. Most of the Farsibans (Farsi-speaking people) in Herat are Pashtuns while some of them are Aimaqs.
Third, mixing language with ethnicity is not appropriate for counting the population of Afghanistan. Precisely, Afghan Persian (Dari) is the mother tongue of Tajiks; however, it does not mean that all Persian-speaking Afghans are of Tajik heritage. The question in this state of affairs is this: Why non-Tajik Afghans prefer to speak Persian (Dari)? The main reason for this situation is that Dari/Farsi was the language of the court, bureaucracy, business, the press, as well as mostly the language of education.
Fourth, Pashto language was suffering from social prestige because the ethnically Pashtun royal and ruling family did not try to learn, read speak and write in Pashto. Hence, Pashto became a neglected, second class national language. If the King and his family members do not communicate in Pashto, why should the prime minister, ministers of departments, university professors, parliamentarians, generals, diplomats, governors, media, business… and the general public use Pashto as the medium of communication. Practically, Pashto speakers could not aspire to position of power in Afghanistan without learning, writing and speaking Dari/Farsi (Persian). In fact, Pashto was precluded from social prestige and blocked from the sphere of political economy. Pashto urgently needed and needs a top-down solution to achieve social prestige. This will enable Pashto to become a productive partner in the framework of political economy. Pashtun poet-philosopher Gul-Pacha Ulfat (1909-1977) had expressed his thought in a couplet on the diminishing social status of Pashto:
People communicate in the language used in the government
When will Pashto become the language of the government
سر او کار د خلکو دی د ژبې د سر کار سره کله به غـریــبه پـښتو ژبه د سـرکارشــي
Fifth, Dari was the main language of education and press. Most schools and all institutions of higher education were taught in Dari. Also, Dari was part of the religious curriculum in mosques and madrasas: The 13th century Persian writer and poet Saadi Shirazi’s two books (Bostan=the Orchard, and Golistan= the Rose) were organized about his Sufi, social and moral thoughts, and for this reason they have been taught in mosques. Today’s Iran (since 1935), former “Persia” and its language “Farsi” (Persian) have always been internationally known as “Persian”, not Irani. As a powerful neighbor, Iran has had a deep cultural influence in Afghanistan. To adjust them to the Iranian cultural ideals, the western cultural exports were “mostly filtered, refined and conditioned.” Practically, Dari was compulsory for all government employees in Afghanistan. Pashtuns and other non-Tajik ethnic groups that were going to Kabul to study and/or to do business, had no other choice but to speak Farsi-Dari. The prominent newspaper “Anis” was published in Dari. There was no girl school for Pashto-speaking population in Kabul. There were only two high schools in Kabul where the teaching language was Pashto: Khoshal Baba Lycee and Rahman Baba Lycee. “Royal court without Pashto means the death of Pashtuns” (be Pashto arg da Pashtano marg dai, Zirakyar). For an analysis of the importance of language, see Zirakyar (December 2010).
Languages not only serve as the means of communication, but also they are the medium of influence, power and identity-especially in a politically organized community (nation state). As long as there are nation states, there will be national interests and national languages. Languages are fundamental to cultural and national identity. The future of humanity depends on both the cultural identity and the cultural diversity. See Zirakyar (Language from Adam to Present, December 2010= Linda 1389 Solar A.H.).
Percentage of Afghan Ethnic Groups Based on Ethnicity and Language
From WAK Foundation Research and Survey (1991-1996)
په افغانستان کې د خـټـې او ژبې په بنسټ د بـیلابـیلو قومونو ســلـنـې، واک فـوڼـډ یشـن:
Number Major Ethnic Groups Based on Ethnicity Based on Language
1 Pashtuns 62.73 55
2 Tajiks 12.38 33
3 Hazaras 9.00 00
4 Uzbeks 6.10 5.80
5 Turkmen 2.69 1.4
6 Aimaqs 2.68 00
For collecting demographic data in Afghanistan, seven regions were determined by the
Wak Foundation as follows:
- Northern Region: Samangan, Balkh, Jozjan and Fariab province.
- North-Eastern Region: Badakhshan, Takhar, Konduz and Baghlan Province.
- North-Western Region: Ghor, Badghis, Herat and Farag Provice.
- Eastern Region: Paktia, Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman Province.
- East-Central Region: Ghazni, Logar, Wardag, Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan and Bayan.
- Southern Region: Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabal, Paktika, and Orzgan.
Ethnicity-Based Percentage of Major Ethnic Groups in Seven Afghan Regions
Regions Pashtuns Tajiks Hazaras Uzbeks
Northern 684,532 148,191 253,756 765,708
30% 6% 11% 33%
North-Eastern 711,194 981,807 89,605 283,916
33% 45% 4% 13%
North-Western 1,115,037 154,912 27,166 6,071
59% 8% 1% 0%
Eastern 1,994,275 18,237 879 0
90% 1% 0 0
East-Central 2,907,405 912,454 1,000,495 37,388
58% 18% 20% 1%
Southern 2,047,679 2,812 239,959 447
87% 0% 10% 0%
89% 0% 0% 0%
Total 11,240,122 2,218,413 1,611,860 1,093,530
62.73% 12.38% 9% 6.10%
Considerable Minorities Total Small Minorities
Aimaqs Turkmen Grand Total
1,305 378,797 2,232,289 61,345 2,293,634
0% 17% 97% 3%
35,149 2,101,671 71,285 2,172,956
2% 97% 3%
478,825 49,046 1,831,057 53,053 1,884,110
25% 3% 97% 3%
2,013,391 200,462 2,213,853
18,694 4,876,436 119,535 4,995,971
0% 98% 2%
2,290,897 67,033 2,357,930
1,780,000 220,000 2,000,000
480,130 481,686 17,125,741 792,713 17,918,454
2.68% 2.69% 95.58% 4.42%
Now, I shall shed some light on the characteristics of the leaders of the Northern Alliance:
Who Are the Major Players in the Northern Alliance?
It is important to also point out and establish the credibility of the leaders of the Northern Alliance as their malicious exercise in indecency in regards to Pashtuns’ demographic manipulation is indicative of their character. The following write-up and quotes are of the U.S. officials assessing the main figures of the Northern Alliance.
Two days after the 9/11 tragedy (during the National Security Council meeting on September 13, 2001), President George W. Bush wanted to know from the CIA leadership about the individual Northern Alliance leaders? Cofer Black (Director of Counterterrorism Center at CIA) said: “One key [Northern] Alliance general, Abdurrashid Dostum, had been on everyone’s payroll-Russia, Iran and Pakistan.” (Quoted in Bob Woodward, 2002, p. 53). Woodward knew from DIA’s “ highly classified memo”, which “in large part blamed General Fahim, essentially calling him a wimp who would talk and talk, then not show up for battle.” (Ibid. 268). CIA’s Director Tenet said at the National Security Council’s above meeting that “with the CIA teams and tons of money, the [Northern] Alliance could be brought together into a cohesive fighting force.” (Ibid., p. 51).
According to Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command Lt. General Michael DeLong, Northern Alliance’s major commanders (Dostam, Khalili, Faheem, and Ismael Khan) were “fighting and killing without remorse” and this “was a way of life for them”. General DeLong adds that “each having personally killed to fifty men”, and after the 911 catastrophe they would be “theoretically” the generals fighting in Afghanistan for the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks. (DeLong with Noah Lukeman 2004, pp. 24-47). Also, General Tommy Franks was aware of the fact that “northern factions fighting against majority Pashtuns” would create another civil war in Afghanistan. (Franks quoted in Berntsen,2005, pp 289-92). Berntsen, who was CIA’s field commander in Afghanistan, informs us about his experience with the Northern Alliance as follows: “ I know from my experience that Persians and their Afghan cousins are all carpet salesman at heart.” By implication, Berntsen believed that the commanders of Northern Alliance would sell Afghanistan like a carpet. On October 30, 2001, Commander-in Chief of the U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks arrived in Tashkent, where Fahim and his treasury minister Aref were waiting for him. Shortly before the meeting, Tommy Franks said to the CIA agent Berntsen: “Time to discuss the price of rugs” with the two Northern Alliance leaders. When Fahim wanted more money, Franks call this try “Bullshit”! (General Tommy Franks (2004, pp 309-311). All the facts, ideas and assumptions presented here shall lead to the following conclusion.
For all their geopolitical games, colonialism and imperialism have been relying on minorities. The Northern Alliance in Afghanistan under the leadership of “Great” Ahmad Shah Massoud is an example par excellence. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had said that “In politics, nothing ever happens by accident. If happened, you can bet it was planned that way.” (Quoted in Moore and Slater, 2003, p. 323). Roosevelt came from an aristocratic and political family, was Harvard law student, corporate lawyer, State Senator, Assistant Secretary of Navy, Governor of New York, and he was the only U.S. President to be elected four times (1932-45). In addition, he led his country through difficult times: the Great Depression and the World War II (1941-1945).
Roosevelt killed two birds with one stone: His war was good for defeating both the depression and Hitler. Based on President Roosevelt’s extensive political experience, I cannot but to agree with his aforementioned statement. His wisdom, judgment and political maturity, as expressed in his statement, are reinforcing my thesis: Since 1992 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has deliberately lowered the socio-linguistic statistics of the resistant majority Pashtuns while it has inflated the ethnic and linguistic population size of the Afghan minorities mostly subservient to the U.S. government’s imperial needs. The anti-Pashtun Northern Alliance under the leadership of Massoud had played the same role for the realization of the Soviet/Russian interests in Afghanistan. Practically, he was the fifth column of foreign powers to undermine the Afghan nation’s solidarity.
CIA’s estimates for ethnic and linguistic statistics in Afghanistan are not without serious consequences for majority Pashtuns, whose demographics had been reduced since July of 1992, the year in which the pro-Tajik Massoud-Rabani team grabbed power in Kabul with the help of Communist generals belonging to the very pro-Soviet Babrak Karmal’s faction. The CIA’s estimates for Afghan demographics will be used to determine quotas for a new privileged but client elite in Afghanistan. For example, a non-Pashtun Afghan-American familiar with the campus of the Stanford University in California informed me in mid-2012 that among the students from Afghanistan there was an “irrelevant minority” (ta’dad-e nachiz) of Pashtun heritage.
However, even if the current regime in Kabul issues electronic Identity Cards, the probability of corruption and fraud could be very high as the current regime is effectively controlled by the lieutenants of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud (see below attachment). The electronic cards need to be prepared and administered when foreign forces and the Northern Alliance do not control the current regime in Kabul. Then, the problem of socio-linguistic statistics can be resolved through electronic identity cards. However, the current colonial, mercenary and multi-dimensional corrupt regime is unable to issue electronic national identity cards. A legitimate, honorable and trustworthy national government will have the capacity to issue such cards. These cards shall include: (1) both parts of identity: ethnicity and language; (2) they shall be finger printed; and (3) the biographical data on the card shall be machine/computer readable; For illustration purposes, I suggest the following design:
Name: Zalanda Samsor
Ethnicity: Pashtun,Hazara, etc
Language: Pashto, Turkmani, Uzbaki, etc.
Mother Language: Pashto, Degani, etc.
Father: Sambal Redai
Born: 1352(1973) in Asmar, Kunar
AFG stands for Afghan; 8 is the number assigned to Kunar province, KR stands for
Kunar province; 9 is the number assigned to the neighboring province Nangarhar; RE stands for Region East; PN stands for Pashtun; and ZSF stands for Zalanda Samsor, Female.
Attachment under Scrutiny
Below see “tazkera” (Identity Card) for Afghans presented by the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the puppet regime in Kabul. The heading of the ID card is printed in
Dari only although article 16 of the colonial constitution of the Kabul regime mentions Pashto first and Dari second as the formal languages of the state. Other information on the ID card is printed first in Dari followed by Pashto translation. I discovered four errors in the Pashto text:
معلومات چه د کورنیو چارو[ د] وزارت په معلوماتی مرکز …. د ولسوالی [ ولسوالۍ ] کوډ…. د زیژیـډلو[زیـږیـدنې/ زیـږیـدلو] کال
These defects exemplify not only negligence but also the intention to damage the social and political prestige of Pashto language, which has the home-grown energy for the national identity of Afghanistan. Also, the word “wagarri” hardly represent the meaning of “atba’ ” (citizens). The word “Wagarri” means people (wolas, khalk).
تبعه( وګړی)، اتباع=وګړي (ولس،خلک). د «هیوادوال» ټکی پوخ سیاسي مفهوم لري، یانې په خپل هیواد کې د برخې، مسولیت او پریکړې خاوند.ځما وړاندیز دادی چې تذکرې ته دې «هـویتـپاڼه» وویل شي او تبعه/اتباعو/وګړو ته دې هیواد وال/هیوادوالان وویل شي. ګوندې په دې اکله پښتو ټولنه خپله چار پوهنه وکارولی شي.
I do not like the word “taba’” (singular for citizen) and “atba’ ” (plural for citizens).The word taba’ implies passivity, dependency and submission; however, the words “hewadwal” (citizen)and its plural (“hewadwalan”) imply political participation, responsibility and the ownership of the country, not of a city, district, or province.
Afghan, Samsor, The Second Saqawi [anarchy, chaos]. (First ed. 1998, 2nd ed. 2001), in Pashto. Second edition includes 414 pages.
سمسور افغان، دویمه سقاوي. لومړئ چاپ ۱۳۷۷ لمریز(۱۹۹۸)، دوهم چاپ ۱۳۷۹ لمریز(۲۰۰۱). خپرندوی: د افغانستان د کلتوري ودې ټولنه، جرمني. دوهم چاپ په ۴۱۴ مخونو کې.
Afghan, Sayed Jamaluddin (1837-1897), in his book “Tatmatul Bayan Fi Tarikhul Afghan”, referenced in: Sediqullah Reshtin, New Reseach (Peshawar/Pashtunkhwa, 1979, p. 98), quoted in Wak (1998)/see below.
صدیق الله رښتین، نوې څیـړنې(پیښور، پښتونخوا، ۱۹۷۹، مخ ۹۸ )/ د افغانستان قــومي جوړښت د افغانستان لپاره د واک فونډیشن شپـږ کلنه(۱۹۹۶-۱۹۹۱) سروې او څیـړنه. لمریز ۱۳۷۷= ۱۱مخ، ۱۹۹۸
Area Handbook for Afghanistan (Washington, DC, 4th edition, 1973).
Aryana Encyclopedia (da aryana daieratul ma’aref, Kabul 2012):
«دافغانستان ملی اتنیکی جوړښت چې په دې وروستیو کې څرګند شوی او په لاندې ډول وړاندی کیـږي: پښتانه ۶۲،۷۳، تاجک ۱۲،۳۸، هزاره ۹،۰۰، ازبک ۶،۱۰، ترکمن ۲،۶۹، ایماق ۲،۶۸….»- مخ ۴۵۵، اریانا دایـرة المعارف
Arnold, Anthony, (Afghanistan’s Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq. Stanford University, California, 1983.
Berntsen, Gary, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaida, 2005).
CIA World Factbook (1981-2012 = 1360-1391 Solar Hijri).
DeLong, Michael with Noah Lukeman, Inside the CentCom: The Unvanished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 20004).
Derbyshire, J.D. and Jan Derbyshire (Political Systems of the World. First published in 1989 by W & R Chambers. Second edition-revised and expanded-published in the United Kingdom 1996 by Helicon Publishing Ltd. First published in the USA in 1996 by St. Martin’s Press in New York.
Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. III (South Asia/Paul Hockings volume editor. Boston Massachusetts: G.H. Hall & Co/Macmillan Inc, 1992).
Franks, Tommy, American Soldier. (New York, NY: 2004).
Encylopedia de L’Agora (2013); Le petit Larousse (2011); Larousse Encyclopedique (2007); Atlas Economique Mondial (2000).
www.hewad.com has published the late Afghan Academician Abdul Shakur Rashad’s tabulation as a reaction to the false demographics published in the CIA Word Factbook in July 1992.
Huntington, Samuel , “The Clash of Civilizations?” (Foreign Affairs, summer 1993-expanded to a book in 1996).
Jervis, Robert, “Intelligence and Foreign Policy,” International Security( winter 1986-1987).
Lewis, Bernard, “The Roots of Muslim Rage” (Atlantic Magazine, 1990).
Magnus, Ralph H. and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press/Perseus Books, 1998.
Margolis, Eric, American Raj: Liberation or Domination? Resolving the Conflict Between the West and the Muslim World (Key Porter Books, 2008).
Moore, James and Wayne Slater, Bush’s Brain. (John Wiley and Sons, 2003).
Nyrop, Richard F. and Donald M. Seekins (Afghanistan: A Country Study. 2001. Electronic Version (2012).
Reshtin, Sediqullah (see above: Afghani, Sayed Jamaluddin ).
Richardson, Bruce G., who traveled to Afghanistan in 1986, 1987, 1990,1991and 1997, has many Afghanistan-related publications, such as these important to my research paper: Afghanistan: A Search for Truth (New York: Free Forum, 2009); Afghanistan, Ending the Reign of Soviet Terror (Bend, OR: Maverick, 1996); From Archives: In Quest for a ‘Greater Tajikistan’ (May 31, 2011); Ethno-centric Russian and U.S. Strategies in Afghanistan; Redrawing Map, Altering the Ethnographic Character of Afghanistan (2012); “A Noteworthy Narrative, Dispelling Partisan and Politically Expedient Mythology” (April 14, 2013); Discriminatory Ethno-Centric Russian and U.S. Strategies Imperil Afghanistan (April 25, 2013).
Sarif, Gul Janan , Das Afghanische Schulwesen (Ph.D. thesis), Von Goethe University, Farnkfurt am Main, Germany, 1972.
Schurmann, H.F., The Moghl of Afghanistan,1962.
Stanizai, Zaman,“From Identity Crisis to Identity in Crisis in Afghanistan”. Electronic version: December 16, 2009 http://www.stanizai.org/ [November 15, 2012].
Wak, Mohammad Enam, The Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan: A Six-year Survey and Research project: 1991- July 1996.Peshawar, Pashtunkhwa (Sapi’s Center for Pashto Research and Development), 1998= 1377 A.H. (In Pashto). Its compact English version was published in Peshawar, Pashtunkhwa (Khatiz Organization for Rehabilitation, July 1999).
Wilber, D.N., Afghanistan: Its people, its society, its culture, 1962.
Woodward, Bob, Bush at War, Simon and Schuster, 2002.
Zakaria, Fareed, the host of “Global Public Square” program at CNN (April 11, 2010) was discussing with Peter Galbraith (former U.N. Representative to Afghanistan).
Zirakyar, Rahmat “Pashtun-Bashing in Kite Runner: A Psychological Operation?” , December 9, 2009. Electronic Version.
Zirakyar, Rahmat Language from Adam to Present, in Pashto (December 2010 = Linda 1389 Solar A.H.). Electronic version, published by www.nahimi.dk/pashto/
زیرکیار، رحمت ربی، ژبه له بابا ادمه تر دې دمه ( لینده ۱۳۸۹ لمریز= دسمبر ۲۰۱۰). الکترانیک چاپ: www.nahimi.dk/pashto/